This study develops a dynamic optimization model to analyze the intertemporal allocation of surface water for irrigation and for hydropower production in the western United States. The issue arises because peak irrigation demands may not coincide with periods of peak demand for power. Water released for irrigation in the spring reduces the reservoir head and diminishes the capacity to generate power during summer peak demands. The optimization model is applied to irrigation districts in central California. Results show considerable deviation between the actual and the optimal allocations. Suboptimal behavior is linked to the districts' failure to articulate clear property rights to the scarce water resources. ᮊ 1998 Academic Press
I. INTRODUCTION
Water is valuable in many alternative uses including crop production, urban consumption, electrical power generation, and recreation. Research indicates that water generally has its lowest marginal productivity in agricultural uses, but agriculture often has the highest priority rights among alternative uses. Economists have, therefore, investigated mechanisms to allocate water from agriculture to competing uses.
This article focuses on the trade-off between water used for agriculture versus water used for hydroelectrical power. Agriculture in much of the western United States depends critically upon irrigation from surface water stored in reservoirs. Often these same water resources are also used to produce hydroelectrical power. Hydropower is an appealing source of energy because it is cheaper and cleaner than energy derived from fossil fuels, and it is renewable. Hydroelectric plants are also capable of generating power on short notice and, hence, are a more flexible source of electricity than steam-driven plants which require several hours to generate power. The energy versus irrigation trade-off has been analyzed in several previous studies. Use of water from the Snake᎐Columbia River system has been investiw x w x gated by McCarl and Ross 13 , Houston and Whittlesey 8 , McCarl and Parandw x w x vash 14 , and Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson 6 . Allocation of water from Egypt's High Aswan Dam was studied by Oven-Thompson, Alercon, and Marks w x w x 15 , while Gisser et al. 4 analyzed utilization of water from the Colorado River in the four corners area of the southwestern United States. Each of these studies used mathematical programming to model agricultural production and to analyze the impacts on the agricultural sector of a water transfer to hydropower production.
The basic approach of changing average water releases was extended by McCarl w x w x and Parandvash 14 and Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson 6 to incorporate the role of timing into the allocation problem. Investments in power generation are determined by peak demands. In this context, stable supplies of hydropower are important because they reduce the necessary investment in fossil fuel generating capacity. These authors examined scenarios whereby irrigation flows could be interrupted during years of low water flow to maintain firm supplies of hydropower.
Research on the hydropower-irrigation trade-off has generally concluded that diversions of water from agricultural to hydropower production have the potential to generate welfare gains especially during years of low water flow. Because these and similar opportunities for improved water allocation have tended to go unexploited, various authors have considered water marketing alternatives as devices to improve resource allocation.
The present study extends this base of work in two dimensions. First, we focus the analysis at the level of the water᎐irrigation district. These organizations control much of the western U.S. surface water, and it is important to examine water resource allocation issues from the perspective of the organizations making the actual allocation decisions.
Second, we broaden the analysis of timing of water allocations to study the implications for agriculture and hydropower production of intrayear variations in the release of water. Timing of water releases within a season is important because in many situations the release of water from the reservoir produces, essentially simultaneously, the joint product of irrigation water and hydropower. There is not the direct trade-off between irrigation and hydropower investigated, for example, in the Snake᎐Columbia River system where releases for irrigation occur upstream from most electricity generating capacity, so, except for return flows, water diverted to agriculture is not available for hydropower production. In joint production situations, the peak season for irrigation demand may not coincide with the peak demand period for electrical power, causing timing of releases to be an important issue. 2 Reduced water flows during periods of peak electricity demand necessitate, as in the analyses of year-to-year interruptible water flows, additional investments in fossil-fuel generating capacity. w x Smith 20 has estimated that nearly all surface water for irrigation in the western United States is provided through either private mutual water companies Ž . or public water supply organizations WSOs . These organizations often also provide hydropower through their water releases. Yet their role in determining w x water allocations has been little analyzed. Exceptions include Smith 20 and Rosen Ž . w x and Sexton RS 17 , who each investigated the incentives of these organizations and their members to participate in rural-to-urban water transfers.
The present study builds upon this work by analyzing WSOs as joint providers of irrigation and hydropower. We develop and apply a dynamic optimization model to determine the optimal flow of water releases, taking into account the value of water both for irrigation and hydropower production. The key trade-off developed in the model is that water released in spring to satisfy irrigation demand diminishes revenues from hydropower production for two reasons: First, power generated in the spring is less valuable than power generated during the summer period of peak demand. Second, water released in the spring diminishes the reservoir head, thus reducing the vertical flow of subsequent water releases and diminishing its powergenerating potential.
The dynamic model is applied to the combined operations of the Turlock Ž . Ž . Irrigation District TID and the Modesto Irrigation District MID in central California, who jointly operate the New Don Pedro Reservoir. Communications with the management of these districts confirm that their operating rule is to release water solely to accommodate irrigation demand. Electricity is, thus, produced essentially as a by-product under the districts' present operation. The empirical analysis indicates, however, that the districts' economic performance could be improved by adjusting its present pattern of water releases to take account of the joint production dimension of its operation.
Following a brief review of the structure of WSOs, the dynamic optimization model is developed. The empirical application to TID᎐MID is then presented. Our concluding remarks focus on the ability to improve the operating strategy of TID, MID, and similar WSOs with respect to the joint production of irrigation water and hydropower and on the structural factors, both internal and external to these organizations, that impede pursuit of optimal outcomes.
II. COOPERATIVE WATER SUPPLY ORGANIZATIONS
Much of the surface water in California and other western states is controlled by WSOs that are formally governmental entities created under various legislative acts. Although the rights and responsibilities of WSOs vary due to differences in the enabling statutes, they generally are endowed with broad corporate powers and also they are endowed with the power to assess property, to tax their constituencies, and to issue bonds. Most revenues, however, are obtained from charges for w x products and services provided 5 . WSOs are generally charged to act as trustees for landowners within their boundaries and they must exercise their title to water w x resources for the equitable and beneficial interests of landowners 20 . Nonetheless, all eligible voters within an organization's geographic boundaries are usually able to vote on matters before it, and voting is generally conducted on the basis of one-person, one-vote. 3 The quasi-public character of WSOs has led them to be called ''invisible w x w x governments'' 11 . RS 17 argued, however, that WSOs function more like agricultural cooperatives than governmental bodies. The economic rationale for their existence, namely, the provision of a farm input that is supplied under conditions of increasing returns to scale and is subject to monopoly power in the absence of a farmer-controlled organization, is the same as the rationale posited w x for agricultural supply cooperatives 18 . Moreover, the basic principles of cooperative behavior, including service at cost, benefits in proportion to use, and memberuser control are met by most WSOs. 4 Even though all residents within a WSO's geographic boundaries are nominally members, the mandate to operate for the benefit of landowners and the generally very low participation in elections for w x WSO officers 11 place the organization effectively under the control and de facto ownership of member farmers.
The joint role of members as users and owners is common to all types of cooperative organizations and distinguishes them from other organizational forms. A concern is that cooperatives' organizational, decision making, and financial structure emphasizes members' role as users and not as owners, a condition which w x w x can lead to suboptimal outcomes 18 . RS 17 argued that these same factors within WSOs may represent key impediments to the execution of socially beneficial transfers of water from rural to urban uses. An important goal of the present research is to determine whether similar factors impede these organizations from attaining optimal joint production of irrigation water and hydropower.
III. THE OPTIMIZATION MODEL
Hydroelectric plants use water turbines to drive generators. The energy is converted into electricity by an alternate-current synchronous generator. The hydropower production function can be written as
where MWH denotes megawatts of electricity production, R t is the rate of water Ž . release, H t , the hydrologic head, is the vertical distance of the water fall from the headwater surface to the generating facility, and E is a constant based on the Ž w x. Ž . overall efficiency of the generating plant Mays 12 . Given the relationship in 1 , storing water behind the dam as a stock raises the head height and increases the value of the subsequent flow. w x In setting forth the optimization problem, we adopt the RS 17 morphology and model the district as an agricultural cooperative with the objective of determining water releases to maximize the members' welfare as farmers and as de facto owners of water flowing into the district-controlled reservoir. 5 Although the model of WSO decision making developed in this section applies specifically to the joint operations of the TID and the MID, the key results of the analysis apply to most organizations that release water for both agriculture and hydropower. 6 In particular, we show that the retail electricity pricing decision is separable from the problem of determining optimal water releases. Thus, the results as to the optimal path of water releases decisions are invariant to most modelling choices as to the specification of the organization's objective function. For example, a decision that electricity consumers' welfare should be included in the organizations' objective function would affect the optimal retail electricity price but not the optimal path of water releases.
The organization must supply sufficient electricity to meet the demands of its customers. If the amount generated by hydropower is insufficient, the organization must either generate additional power, e.g., from a fossil-burning plant, or purchase it in wholesale markets. Let electricity demand facing the organization be Ž Ž . . Ž . D Pr t , t , Ѩ DrѨ Pr -0, where Pr t is the price set by the organization, and the Ž . separate t argument in D и indicates that electricity demand is time-dependent. The organization is assumed to be a perfect competitor in the wholesale electricity market and is able to buy or to sell any volume in that market at a constant price, Ž . Po t . This wholesale price represents the opportunity cost to the organization of electricity sold to its retail customers.
The organization's gross profit from electricity production and sale can then be expressed as the static problem,
Ž . where MWH t , the amount of electricity generated at time t through the organization's hydropower generation facilities, is subject to the hydropower production Ž . function 1 , and c is the variable cost of hydropower generation. The solution to Ž . 2 produces the following mark up rule for Pr relative to the wholesale price Po, Pr t s Po t , 3
Ž . Ž . Ž .
Ž . Ž Ž ..Ž Ž . . where t s y Ѩ DrѨ Pr t Pr t rD is the elasticity of electricity demand facing the WSO. 7 
Ž .
Ž . From 3 , Pr t depends only on the wholesale market price and the retail demand elasticity, indicating that the static electricity pricing problem can be separated from the problem of determining optimal water releases. The pricing Ž . solution in 3 yields the maximum revenues from production and sale of any amount of electricity generated through the hydropower production function. The Ž Ž . Ž . Ž . . resulting profit function, ⌽ R t , H t N Po t , t , becomes part of the objective functional in the organization's control problem to determine the optimal path of water releases. This separability result insures the veracity of this article's results across a wide range of institutional settings. For example, several WSOs have no retail outlets and sell power exclusively in the wholesale market.
The second source of revenue from the organization's operations is the supply of irrigation water as an input into farm production. Static agricultural production models ignore the importance of timing of the application of inputs in relation to Ž . the growth rate of the product being produced. To incorporate this feature, let S t denote the aggregate stock of crop grown by the organization's farmer-members at time t during the production season. Crop growth depends on the application of Ž . Ž . irrigation water W t and other inputs X t according to the dynamic production function,Ṡ
Ž . Revenues from farm production are the product of the market price, P T , and the Ž . total production, S T , at the harvest or terminal period T.
Ž . Farmers purchase X t freely through the market at price c , assumed for 1 simplicity to be constant over the growing season. Costs of surface water application are assumed to be a constant value, c , per unit. Water input is constrained by 2 Ž . the volume, R t , released from the reservoir. However, water may be released Ž . Ž . w x without being diverted for irrigation: W t F R t for all t g 0, T .
Revenues from the sale of both electricity and crops are functions of the magnitude and the timing of the release of water downstream. The optimal intertemporal allocation of this resource requires balancing its value in current use with its value for storage and subsequent release. WSOs as joint providers of hydropower and water for irrigation have, in principle, both the incentive and information needed to make such an optimal allocation.
The control problem that yields the optimal release of water and the optimal application of surface water and other inputs in farming is
Ž . Ž . V t , the volume of water in storage, and S t , the stock of crops are state Ž . Ž . Ž . variables, and R t , the volume of water released at each t, and X t and W t , the Ž . inputs into farm production, are the control variables in problem 5 . The equation Ž . Ž . of motion in 5b describes the rate of change in the state variable, V t , as equal Ž . Ž . to F t , the natural inflow of water net of evaporation, less releases, R t . V in 0 Ž . 5b denotes the initial amount of water in the reservoir, V is the level of dead T 0 Ž . storage plus carryover requirement, and the R in 5c are minimum periodic t Ž . releases to preserve fish flow. Constraint 5e describes the relationship between Ž . Ž Ž .. head height, H t , and the volume of water in the reservoir. h V t is an Ž . increasing concave function hЈ ) 0, hЉ -0 because the reservoir walls slope outward.
The control problem in 5 captures in a simple way the dynamics that are essential to crop production. The problem extends readily to consider multiple Ž . crops rather than the single stock of crops represented by S t . Such a formulation would require the allocation of inputs among alternative crops, but this and other possible complications do little to elucidate the dynamics that are fundamental to the article. 8 
The problem in 5 is solved by first forming the Hamiltonian,
where and are the costate variables for the crop production and the reservoir 1 2 stocks, respectively. Next form the Lagrangian,
Ž . The necessary conditions to maximize 7 are as follows,
s yc q s 0, 8a
Ž .
Ѩ␦ Ѩ␦
8 The empirical control model includes water requirements for 10 separate cropping activities. The availability of water from other sources such as ground water is incorporated readily into the problem Ž . through constraint 5d . Ground water availability is also considered explicitly in the application. Because the model considers allocations of water within a cropping season, issues of discounting are considered unimportant and, hence, ignored.
The control problem has a finite trajectory with state constraints in the terminal period. Thus, the model optimizes the transient trajectory rather than a steady state. Despite the absence of an analytical solution, some qualitative properties of the optimal trajectory are discerned readily from the necessary conditions. Equa-Ž . Ž . tions 8a and 8b are the optimizing conditions for application of inputs X and W, respectively, to the stock of crop S. They are merely dynamic analogues of the familiar static production rule requiring the equating of an input's marginal value product with its input price. Here, however, the price is given by the shadow value of an additional unit of the stock of the crop in the ground, , rather than a 1 Ž . market price. In addition, 8b requires that marginal applications of irrigation water account for the cost of the limitation imposed on it by the flow of releases from the reservoir, namely, . If ) 0 at some point in time, then the release Ž . Ž . constraint 5d is binding by 8h , and an incremental application of W requires a commensurate release from the reservoir. The value of at the optimum captures this impact in terms of additional electricity revenue generated by the release and also future revenues that are foregone due to the reduction of reservoir stock.
The shadow value of water stored in the reservoir is measured by the costate variable . The net marginal benefit in both electricity and crop production of 2 releasing water must equal the shadow value of maintaining that water in storage for later release adjusted for the marginal benefits of the minimum release constraint. Water should remain in storage if its asset value is higher than its value Ž . Ž . in current use to produce electricity and to irrigate crops. Combining 8b and 8c shows the balance in each time period between the long-and short-run values of the water resource,
equates the marginal value of water retained in the reservoir, , 2 adjusted by the cost, ␦ , of meeting the minimum flow constraints, with the sum of the net benefit from hydropower generation and the net value of a marginal contribution of water use to agricultural production. It is by optimizing this relationship in all time periods that the empirical model selects the optimal profile of water releases, given the relative values and constraints on the system. The marginal net benefit of releasing water for electricity is determined by the Ž . differential between the wholesale price, Po t , and the generating costs, c; the Ž . retail price is irrelevant. Thus, these results apply generally to a organizations Ž . that have no market power in the retail electricity market, b organizations that Ž . sell exclusively in the wholesale electricity market, and c organizations that might pursue a dual objective function and might set retail prices with consideration to consumers' welfare.
Ž . Ž . The equations in 8d and 8e prescribe the behavior over time of the costate Ž . variables. In the first equation of 8e , the right-hand side is the negative of the current value in electricity production of an incremental unit of reservoir stock, V. Because this value is always positive, declines monotonically over the season, 2 reflecting that water stored in the reservoir is more valuable early in the season when it can contribute to electricity production throughout the horizon T than is stock held later in the season when its electricity-generating potential is limited.
Ž . The transversality conditions in 8e relate to the reservoir dead storage and Ž Ž .
.
IV. APPLICATION TO CALIFORNIA IRRIGATION DISTRICTS
The empirical analysis focuses on the joint operations of TID and MID, customer-controlled irrigation districts which provide water for irrigation and hydropower in Stanislaus and Merced counties in central California. We model the two districts jointly because they share water from the New Don Pedro Reservoir. Don Pedro has a storage capacity of 2,030,000 acre feet of water, of which 68% Ž . Ž . 32% is owned by TID MID . Water released from the reservoir flows through the power house into the Tuolumne River. It then flows through the Turlock and Modesto canals, from which it is diverted to an irrigation network of canals and laterals operated by TID and MID. The network operates on gravity and does not use pumps to move the water.
TID obtains most of its internally generated power from hydropower, and in an average year meets 35᎐45% of its energy load from its hydropower generation facilities. Hydropower is a less important internal source for MID, which also operates a geothermal generating plant. Additional power for both districts is obtained via long term contracts or is purchased through the wholesale spot market. The empirical analysis utilized data for 1988. Complete data for more recent years were unavailable. In 1988 the districts jointly served about 140,000 electricity customers within their mutual service area and approximately 9,000 irrigation customers on land parcels totalling 222,000 acres.
The empirical analysis involved constructing and optimizing an empirical analog Ž . to the control model in 5 . Like its theoretical counterpart, the empirical control model consists of farm production and hydrological components. It was formulated into 12 discrete months to conform with the available data, including the net inflows into the reservoir, the monthly ground and surface water allocated to each county, and the beginning and terminal values for the reservoir stock.
Farm production was modelled using the positive mathematical programming Ž . w x PMP methodology developed by Howitt 9, 10 . PMP posits that the behavior observed for perfectly competitive farmers must represent optimizing behavior, but it recognizes that a cost component in addition to the observed, constant average costs is generally required to rationalize the actual crop allocation pattern with the conditions for a profit-maximizing allocation.
The first step in the methodology was the construction of a linear programming Ž . LP model of irrigated farm production in the districts' service area, Stanislaus and Merced counties, for the 1988 base year. Data on acreage, yield, variable production cost, price, and water use were obtained for 10 major irrigated crops: alfalfa, corn, wheat, irrigated pasture, sweet potatoes, apples, almonds, peaches, walnuts, and grapes. 9 Monthly water use for each crop in each county was computed from evapotranspiration data Ž . compiled by the California Department of Water Resources CDWR . Evapotranspiration is the process by which water is transpired by plants and evaporated from the soil surface. The rate of evapotranspiration thus determines applied water requirements in central California, where there is little or no rainfall during the growing season. Data on crop acreage, yields, and prices were from County Crop Reports for Stanislaus and Merced Counties. Crop production costs were obtained from periodic reports compiled by the University of California Cooperative Extension Service.
The LP model was then constrained by calibration to replicate the actual acreage for each cropping activity in each county in the base year 1988. The solution to this LP problem yields a vector of shadow prices for constrained inputs and for the amount of land allocated to each crop in each county. These shadow values were then used in the second stage to calculate the input cost share equations in the base year and to derive a quadratic cost function for land allocated to each crop. In turn, the share equations were utilized to construct a Ž . constant elasticity of substitution CES production function for each crop in each county with W, applied water, and with X, land augmented by other variable inputs including labor and capital, as inputs. 10 The CES production functions enable the empirical model to depict substitution between water and other inputs. For Ž . example, either capital improved irrigation technology or labor might be used to improve the efficiency of water delivery to crops, thus enabling X to substitute, albeit imperfectly, for W.
Specification of quadratic land costs, with increasing marginal costs, is to recognize explicitly the heterogeneity in land quality which, when expanding land allocation to a given crop, results in increasingly less suitable acreage being placed into production. The presence of the quadratic land cost function makes it possible to rationalize as optimizing behavior land allocations to crops that exhibit differential a¨erage rates of return. The shadow values from the land calibration constraints represent the additional ''implicit'' costs that are required for the marginal conditions of optimization on land allocation to hold across crops.
The CES production technology was specified as follows,
where i denotes the 10 irrigated crops included in the study, j indexes Merced and Ž . Stanislaus Counties, the ␣ are scale parameters, the ␤ and 1 y ␤ are share i, j i , j i , j Ž . parameters for inputs X and W respectively, and s y 1 r , where is i, j i , j the elasticity of substitution, assumed for this application to be 0.7 based on w x. w x experimental data generated by Hatchett 7 . Howitt 10 describes in detail the computations needed to derive the ␣ and ␤ parameters of the CES cost i, j i , j function and the parameters of the quadratic land cost function given a value for the elasticity of substitution, the data set from the LP model, and the input shadow values from the solution to the stage 1 LP model. Optimization, given the nonlinear production model constructed in this manner, will then replicate exactly the observed base-year solution except for rounding errors. Given the general lack of rainfall during the growing season, water input to a given crop and county, W , must come from either diversions of surface water,
Ws andror pumping of ground water, Wg ,
Although the total annual water per acre to a given crop was allowed to change Ž . based on the substitution possibilities embedded in 10 , the available water was 10 This ''augmented land'' input was formulated by combining all inputs except water in their proportions observed in the 1988 base data. This approach assumes implicitly that there is no substitution among the factors represented in the composite input and focuses the analysis on substitution possibilities between water and other inputs. allocated across the growing season in a fixed proportion because seasonal water proportions for a given crop are mostly fixed by agronomic criteria, and water in one part of the growing season cannot be substituted readily for that in another. This constraint was imposed empirically by obtaining the proportion, ␦ , of total i, j, t Ž . water applied in each of the irrigation months 3᎐10 March᎐October to each crop in each county and expressing that condition in the form of a constraint as follows,
i.e., sufficient ground andror surface water must be diverted to each crop in each month to enable that crop to receive the proportion of its total water allocation needed in that month.
11
The hydrological component of the empirical model captures the benefits to TID᎐MID from generating their own power versus purchasing it in the wholesale market. This benefit per unit is defined as the wholesale price of electricity per MWH minus the per-unit generation costs incurred by TID᎐MID. The wholesale price changes monthly based on market conditions, and also changes during the day in accord with peak, mid-peak, and off-peak periods. We assumed that TID᎐MID would rationally time daily releases to generate power when it was most valuable. Thus, power generated from up to 6 hours of releases was valued at the daily peak rate to coincide with the length of the peak period. Power from additional releases, if any, was valued at the mid-peak rate up to the reservoir's capacity to produce power during the 9-hour mid-peak period, and so forth. Let Pe H , Pe M , and Pe L denote the peak, mid-peak, and off-peak wholesale price,
respectively, net of per-unit generating costs, c. The amount of power generated from a hydroelectric plant is a function of the Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. volume of water released R t , the height of the reservoir head H t , and the Ž . Ž . overall plant efficiency, E, as noted in 1 . Direct use of Eq. 1 was not possible Ž . Ž . because we lacked data on both E and H t . The alternative was to express 1 in Ž . Ž . Ž . log form, use 5e to replace H t with the volume of water in storage, V t , for which data were available, and treat E as a constant to be estimated. This equation was estimated using 1988 data for Don Pedro on power production, releases, and storage. The hydropower and agricultural components of the model are linked through the monthly surface water releases because applications of agricultural surface 11 This assumption is agronomic in the sense that the model does not allow irrigation water from one stage of the crop's growth to be substituted for water in another stage. The resulting production Ž function has normal CES properties for the whole production period but has a von Liebig form Paris w x. 16 for dynamic decisions during the production period.
water in a given month cannot exceed R , although the level of releases may t exceed the amount diverted to agriculture,
Ws
F R , t s 3, . . . , 10. 15
In all applications, minimum monthly releases for fish flow were required: R G R 0 , t s 1, . . . , 12, and the initial and terminal stocks of water in the reservoir t t
were held constant at their historical levels, enabling the results to depict solely the effects of reallocating the temporal release pattern within a given irrigation season,
Two versions of the empirical control model were considered. In one version Ž . OPTIMAL I , the path of groundwater pumping was fixed at the estimated actual levels, and the choice variables were the monthly water releases R , the surface t water diversions to individual crops, W in each county, and the application of i, j composite input, X . 12 The OPTIMAL I control model can be stated formally as
follows.
H M subject to 10 , 12 ᎐ 16 , where P is the farm price for crop i, MWH , MWH , i and MWH L denote electricity production during peak, mid-peak, and off-peak periods, respectively, c is the per-unit cost of delivering surface water to county j, j and a and b are the parameters for the quadratic land cost functionᎏsee i, j i , j w x Howitt 10 for the computational details.
Ž . The alternative version of the empirical control problem OPTIMAL II incorporates the allocation of ground water. We considered a hypothetical policy regime where both ground and surface water releases were under the control of an Ž . organization like TID or MID. To conduct this analysis, the control problem in 17 was augmented to incorporate the costs of pumping ground water, and constraints Ž . were added to insure that a the total ground water released in each county did Ž . not exceed the actual amount pumped in the base year, and b the sum of groundwater allocated to crops did not exceed the total amount of groundwater pumped in the county,
Actual ground water releases were estimated by computing the total monthly water requirement for each crop from the CDWR evapotranspiration data. If some crops required more water than the surface water released in a given month, it was assumed that the remaining water came from ground water pumping.
V. RESULTS
The empirical control models were solved using the nonlinear optimization routine GAMSrMINOS. A baseline version of the model was run to replicate the districts' actual operations for each base year. These base solutions were then compared to the results obtained by solving the control models OPTIMAL I and OPTIMAL II for the profit maximizing path of water releases and the input allocations to agriculture.
The flow of water releases and ground water pumping for the irrigation months of March᎐October under optimal solutions I and II for base year 1988 are summarized and compared to the estimated actual 1988 outcome in Fig. 1a and 1b . Under either optimal solution, the districts release less water on average during the spring and early summer months than actually occurred. This action increases the reservoir head and enables the districts to increase releases and hydropower production during August and September, the months when wholesale power is 13 Ž . most expensive. From the hydropower production function 1 , delaying the release enhances the energy-generating capacity of a given stock of water. This Ž . outcome is consistent with the result in 8e from the theoretical model that water stored in the reservoir is most valuable in the early months of the irrigation season. The actual allocation, configured solely to meet irrigation needs, releases more water than is optimal for the period March᎐July, with peak releases occurring in July. More water remains in storage under the optimal solution through July in anticipation of release in August and September.
Incorporating the allocation of ground water into the problem causes relatively more ground water to be pumped in the month of July to replace the surface water retained in storage under the optimal solution. In turn, less groundwater is pumped in August and September under the optimal solution than occurred in actuality. Substitution of ground for surface water in these months enables the reservoir volume to be maintained at higher levels, thus enhancing the electricity generating capacity in the high-cost electricity months of August and September.
Implementation of the optimal solutions caused only modest changes in the observed cropping pattern. With one exception, the acreage devoted to a crop changed less than 1% in the optimal solution relative to the base. The exception was pasture in Merced county, which increased in acreage by 2.6%. This result is intuitive because, among the 10 crops, pasture can best utilize water during the high flow months of August and September. All crops received less water under the Ž . additional watering in August and September, its acreage increases under OPTI-MAL I to accommodate the high surface water releases during those months. OPTIMAL II also releases more surface water during August and September than does the base run, but it compensates by curtailing costly ground water pumping during those months. Total water available under OPTIMAL II in August is 78% and in September is 58% of that available under OPTIMAL I. Thus, pasture acreage diminishes under OPTIMAL II both relative to OPTIMAL I and to base.
It was a dry year in 1988 from the perspective of TID and MID, so as a comparative static experiment, a ''wet year'' was simulated by proportionately increasing flows to generate a range of the likely benefits from optimal joint provision of water for hydropower and irrigation. In reconsidering the control problem within this context, we fixed the cropping pattern to conform with 1988, thereby focussing the analysis purely on the effects of a greater flow of water into the reservoir. ''Actual'' groundwater pumpage under this hypothetical scenario was estimated using the method described in note 9. The model solutions are summarized in Fig. 2a and 2b . Both the OPTIMAL I and OPTIMAL II solutions release less water than the actual solution during the months of May᎐July and then each releases water at the reservoir capacity from August᎐October. Groundwater is less important given the hypothetical high flow of surface water, and the optimal solution involves pumping only during May in contrast to the imputed actual solution which pumps in both June and July. In general, the time path of water releases under either optimal solution differs less from the actual path under Ž . conditions of high flow than under low flow compare Figs. 1a and 2a . This result reflects the intuitive point that proper management of the resource becomes more important the more scarce is the resource.
The change in income to members of TID᎐MID from implementing the optimal allocations is the additional revenues from electricity production and sale, less the reduction in profits from crop production. 14 Table I summarizes the income changes in actual 1988 dollars. Under OPTIMAL I revenues to TID᎐MID from electricity generation increased by $1.309 million. This additional revenue comes from two sources: additional power generated from managing the reservoir head and greater average price per MWH from timing releases to better coincide with seasonal peaks in wholesale prices. Table I reports the average value per MWH generated from hydropower based on wholesale prices. Of the additional electricity income, under OPTIMAL I, 86% was due to a greater average price.
The total income change under OPTIMAL I is only slightly less, $1.273 million, than the incremental electricity revenue, indicating that the enhancement of income from electricity generation was achieved with only modest reductions in the income from crop production. Allowing ground water to be added to the optimization mix increased total returns by an additional 37.2%. 15 The opportunity to increase income is less in a year with high water flows in accord with the principle noted previously that it is more important to manage the resource when it is relatively scarce. Electricity income increased by $588 thousand and total income increased by $532 thousand under OPTIMAL I, given the hypothetical high-flow scenario. Under high-flow conditions about 63% of the additional electricity revenue was from a higher average price. Under high-flow 14 
Ž
. Note that the PMP methodology insures that the base actual crop allocation pattern is optimal from the model's perspective. Thus, evaluation of the revenue gain to the optimal solutions is not muddied by revenues generated through an improved crop allocation pattern. 15 To test whether the estimates of income gain obtained in this study were sensitive to the value of 0.7 imputed for the elasticity of substitution, we also ran models using s 0.2 and s 0.99. The total income gain is, of course, increasing in the value of , but the magnitude of the change was not large. For OPTIMAL II and the 1988 base year, the income gain was 0.8% higher when s 0.99 and 1.9% lower when s 0.2. However, as expected, reductions in water input to crops were on average greater when s 0.99 and less when s 0.2. conditions, TID᎐MID are taking maximum advantage of peak-period prices throughout the March᎐October period. The optimal solution increases releases in August and September to take advantage of the high electricity rates, but these marginal releases are valued at mid peak rather than at peak rates. Similarly, the additional income to be obtained from adding ground water into the optimization mix is less under the high-flow scenario because most water needs are met by surface water. In addition to these private benefits from pursuing the optimal policy, there are societal benefits from producing cleaner energy and reducing the requirements for fossil-fuel generating plants. Social costs would include possible adverse implications for recreational uses from adjusting the seasonal release of water.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This research has established rules for the optimal intraseasonal allocation of Ž . surface water for a cooperative water supply organization WSO that produces water for both irrigation and hydropower. The rules prescribe the allocation pattern that maximizes farmer-members' welfare as users of irrigation water and as de facto owners of the scarce water resource. Timing of the release of water within a season is important because the periods of peak demand for irrigation water generally occur in the spring and early summer, whereas peak power demand occurs in the mid to late summer. Maximization of member welfare requires a WSO to balance at each point in time the current value of water released for irrigation and hydropower production with its asset value in storage for later release. Holding water in a reservoir raises the reservoir head and, thus, enhances the future electricity-generating potential of any subsequent release. Ž The model was applied to the Turlock and Modesto Irrigation Districts TID-. MID in central California. The Districts' actual water release pattern was found to differ rather significantly from the optimal allocation, with the Districts releasing relatively more water in the spring than prescribed in the optimal solution, which called for relatively greater releases during the period of peak electricity prices in August and September. This result was not unexpected because officials of the districts have indicated that releases are timed exclusively to meet irrigation needs.
A key question is whether the institutional ᎐legal dimensions of WSOs contribute to suboptimal outcomes from the perspective of these organizations' members. Optimization requires balancing members' dual role as both users and owners. However, cooperative enterprises, including WSOs, may not recognize or reward members' ownership role and instead base returns to membership exclusively on use.
In agricultural cooperatives this practice is codified in the principle of allocating returns based upon patronage and in laws that restrict the amounts that can be paid as dividends on capital. The problem is probably even more extreme in WSOs where the members' role as effective owners of the rights to scarce water resources is not even recognized formally. The not surprising outcome is that members of these organizations pursue rationally their interests as users and demand unfettered access to cheap water.
Within TID᎐MID this behavior results in use of electricity revenues to cross subsidize the supply of irrigation water. For example, in 1988 TID and MID jointly realized $3,066,000 from sale of irrigation water and reported $11,535,000 in costs of operating and maintaining the irrigation system. If the districts were to restructure their water releases to take account of their role in generating electricity revenue, net revenues from electricity sales would increase. However, under the Districts' zero profit requirement and present system of finance, this additional revenue would likely result in even lower charges for irrigation water, causing members to demand more, not less, as required to implement the optimal solution.
Thus, the apparent failure of cooperative WSOs in the western United States to allocate optimally water for irrigation and electricity production owes to a failure of these organizations to articulate clear property rights to the scarce water resources. Effective control of these organizations is in the hands of farmer-members, who receive benefits only as users and not as owners of the organization and who behave rationally in this environment.
Efficient use of water resources requires the establishment of clear property rights within WSOs in contrast to the present situation where the water rights controlled by an organization are treated as common property within the organization. Prices for irrigation water should reflect the opportunity cost of release of the resource, namely, its value in storage for subsequent release. Given that storage values are greater at the start of an irrigation season, water rate structures need to be based upon time of use, with the highest rates in the spring. This reform, though, would be opposed by farmer-members who derive benefits strictly as users but could be supported by farmers who, through ownership rights, received entitlement to the enhanced net revenue stream achieved from optimizing the seasonal allocation of water.
